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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR DENNIS KUSY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
K-MART APPAREL FASHIONS CORP., 
a Delaware corporation and 
JOHN DOE, an individual, 
Defendants/Respondent. 
Case No. 18360 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Arthur Dennis Kusy brought this action against 
defendants K-Mart Apparel Fashions Corp. (hereinafter "defen-
dant") and John Doe to recover for injuries he suffered as a 
result of a fall from a wooden pallet being used by plaintiff 
for the purpose of unloading trees from a truck on def en-
dant's premises. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, entered judgment for defendant upon a special 
jury verdict wherein the jury unanimously found that def en-
dant was not negligent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The lower court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the lower court's judgment 
and order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a heavy truck driver since 1967, was injured 
on May 21, 1976 at a K-Mart store in Murray, Utah, while he 
was in the process of unloading shrubbery and trees from his 
truck. (R. 218, 227-30, 314). Plaintiff was the only wit-
ness at trial who had actually seen how the accident 
occurred. (R. 353, 362). In the statement of facts in his 
brief, plaintiff has outlined in detail his version of the 
accident, which version defendant incorporates with the 
following additions. 
Defendant agrees that plaintiff has had extensive back-
ground and experience with wooden pallets. Of the million 
and one-half miles of truck driving that plaintiff had done, 
approximately 150,000 miles involved loads using wooden 
pallets. (R. 271). Plaintiff further admits that he has 
probably seen and worked around at least 250,000 pallets in 
his life time. (R. 271-72). 
-2-
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Although defendant admits that it had several pallets in 
its possession, it had no control over the pallets since 
most, if not all, of the pallets were provided by the various 
suppliers of goods to be sold in the garden shop. (R. 
336-37, 361). The suppliers were free to retrieve their 
pallets at any time, although defendant or another supplier 
might use them in the meantime for loading, unloading or 
storage. (R. 338, 340-41, 358-60). The pallet that plain-
tiff fell from, or through, was one of those pallets, 
although its exact source is unknown. (R. 345). 
Mr. Hunt, the garden shop manager for defendant, stated 
that he did not know whether the pallet had broken or whether 
plaintiff had simply fallen off of the pallet and admitted 
that the pallet could have broken. (R. 368-69). Neverthe-
less, plaintiff attempted to introduce K-Mart's Answers to 
Interrogatories, specifically Interrogatory No. 9, at trial. 
(R. 365, 367-68). Therein, defendant K-Mart (not witness 
Hunt), in answer to a question regarding its version of the 
accident, stated that the pallet broke. (R. 65-66). The 
lower court refused to admit the answer and would not allow 
plaintiff to read the interrogatory and answer to Mr. Hunt. 
(R. 365, 422). 
-3-
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The jury, in its special verdict, found that neither 
plaintiff nor defendant were negligent in causing the acci-
dent. (R. 187-88). 
Plaintiff moved for a new trial on March 2, 1982 on simi-
lar grounds as this appeal. (R. 190-91). The motion was 
denied by the lower court on March 11, 1982. (R. 195). 
ARGUMENT 
As grounds for reversal, plaintiff contends: (1) that 
the trial court improperly failed to give his requested jury 
instructions on res ipsa loquitur; (2) that the trial court's 
instruction on unavoidable accident was improper; (3) that 
the trial court improperly excluded defendant's answer to 
Interrogatory No. 9 in its Answers to Interrogatories for the 
purpose of cross examining defendant's witness, Mr. Hunt; and 
(4) that the jury's failure to award general damages indi-
cated passion and prejudice for which a new trial should have 
been granted. 
Plaintiff has failed to establish that the trial court 
committed reversible error under any of the above-described 
circumstances. 
-4-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
Defendant agrees that Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956), sets forth elements 
of res ipsa loquitur. There, the court stated the following 
general rule: 
In order to invoke this doctrine it is gener-
ally recognized that the following elements must be 
present: (1) That the accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had due care been observed; (2) That it 
happened irrespective of any participation by the 
plaintiff; and (3) That the cause thereof was some-
thing under the management or control of the def en-
dant, or for which it is responsible. 
Id., 302 P.2d at 472 (footnotes omitted). With regard to the 
third element, this court, in Wightman, further stated: 
w[I]f the evidence reasonably eliminates other explanations 
than the defendant's negligence, that provides the basis upon 
which the jury may be permitted to infer that it was the 
defendant's negligence which resulted in the injury.w Id., 
302 P.2d at 473. 
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are set out, in the 
Restatement of Torts, in a manner virtually identical to the 
elements described in Wightman. Section 328D provides: 
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the 
plaintiff is caused by negligence of the defendant 
when 
-5-
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(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily 
does not occur in the absence of negligence; 
(b) other responsible causes, including the 
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are suf-
ficiently eliminated by the evidence; and 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the 
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 3280 (1965). 
Plaintiff has failed to establish that the elements of 
res ipsa loquitur are present in this case. The fact that 
the court gave the unavoidable accident instruction (dis-
cussed below) and the fact that the jury found neither party 
was negligent demonstrates that the accident involved in this 
case, in the ordinary course of events, could have happened 
and in fact did happen, in the absence of negligence. 
Moreover, the evidence has failed to eliminate other 
explanations (namely, the acts of plaintiff and/or third per-
sons) that reasonably could have caused the accident or that 
the pallet allegedly causing the accident was under the 
management, control or responsibility of defendant. 
The situation in this case was not unlike a master-
servant situation wherein the employee is injured during his 
employment. Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur no 
longer applies to master-servant situations because of 
worker's compensation laws, some earlier cases and cases from 
-6-
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other jurisdictions are instructive with regard to the appli-
cation of res ipsa loquitur here. 
In Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wash. 2d 802, 180 P.2d 564 
(1947), plaintiff brought an action against defendant for the 
death of her husband resulting from a fall in an elevator 
shaft at the deceased's place of employment. The trial court 
entered judgment on a verdict for plaintiff but the 
Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the 
plaintiff's deceased was presumed to have exercised due care, 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable. The 
court stated: 
We have here a situation where the person 
injured knew as much about the elevator and its 
manner of operation as did the appellants, perhaps 
more, and there is no element of exclusive control. 
• • • 
• • . When it is shown that the accident might 
have happened as a result of one of two causes, the 
reason for the rule [res ipsa loquitur] fails, and 
it cannot be invoked. 
Id., 180 P.2d at 571 (quoting Wellons v. Wiley, 24 Wash. 2d 
543, 166 P.2d 852, 855 (1946)). 
Similarly, in Sabol v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 313 Mo. 
527, 282 s.w. 425 (1925), plaintiff was injured when a stack 
of barrel staves fell upon him while he was in the course of 
his employment for defendant. The lower court entered judg-
ment on a verdict for plaintiff, but the Missouri Supreme 
-7-
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Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur did not apply. The court made the following statement: 
•[N]o presumption of negligence on the part of the master 
arises, where it does not appear that an appliance was 
originally defective, or that it has been so long in use as 
to render the duty of inspection necessary, or that the 
master had due notice of the defect.• Id., 282 s.w. at 429. 
The court further stated: •[w]here the servant or his associ-
ates have knowledge or opportunity to know of the defect, the 
rule does not apply ...• • Id., 282 s.w. at 430 (emphasis 
added). 
The court in Sabol closely follows Klebe v. Parker 
Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480, 105 s.w. 1057 (1907). There, 
the lower court granted a demurrer to defendant and the 
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employee 
injured by the fall of an elevator was not entitled to assert 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because •[i]f the elevator 
or the cable was defective or out of repair, there was 
nothing to prevent plaintiff and his co-employes from seeing 
them ••.. • Id., 105 s.w. at 1060. 
Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a judgment 
for plaintiff in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 
62 P.2d 1297 (1936), holding that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur was not applicable when a gas heater provided by the 
-8-
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employer but lit by the employee, exploded. The court 
stated: •[I]f the circumstances do not show or suggest that 
defendant should have that superior knowledge, or if the 
plaintiff himself possesses equal or superior means of 
explaining the occurrence, the rule may not properly be 
invoked.• Id., 62 P.2d at 1308. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's injuries could have had 
two possible causes: (1) plaintiff fell off of the pallet 
for some reason; or (2) the pallet broke because of an undis-
covered or latent defect in the pallet. The jury could have 
drawn an inference from the evidence that plaintiff fell from 
the pallet. Therefore, there was evidence that plaintiff 
participated and the res ipsa loquitur instructions were not 
proper. 
Even if plaintiff's injury was caused by a latent or 
undiscovered defect, the plaintiff had substantial knowledge 
and experience with regard to wooden pallets. (R. 58-59). 
It is doubtful that Mr. Hunt or anyone at defendant's store 
had superior or even equal knowledge to plaintiff regarding 
wooden pallets. Plaintiff was closest to the pallet at the 
time of the injury and was best able to detect and observe 
the defects, if any, in the pallet. Consequently, it does 
not appear that this accident was one which would have 
occurred without the participation of plaintiff, whether that 
-9-
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participation was negligent or not, and the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur does not apply. 
Numerous other explanations for the accident can be 
inferred from the evidence. Also, possible participation by 
third parties also indicates that the pallet from or through 
which plaintiff fell was not within the control or responsi-
bility of the defendant. Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur cannot be applied. At least two Utah cases support 
this proposition. 
In Reich v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District No. 
l1 29 Utah 2d 125, 506 P.2d 53 (1973), several home owners 
sued the sewer district for a sewer backup causing flooding 
of raw sewage into their homes. The lower court instructed 
the jury upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The jury 
found that defendant did not have exclusive control of the 
system but that the defendant did have responsible control. 
Consequently, the jury awarded damages and judgment was 
entered in the favor plaintiffs. This court reversed the 
lower court and held that because there were numerous other 
possible explanations for the defect in the sewer line 
(namely, items placed in the line by some 270 users on 
lateral lines, people entering manholes at their convenience 
or digging in the area by contractors) that could not have 
-10-
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been caused by defendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was inapplicable. Id., 506 P.2d at 54. 
Reich indicates that exclusive control, rather than mere 
responsibility, is required to apply the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. Id., 506 P.2d at 53. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is 
not applicable to this case, as defendant clearly did not 
have exclusive control over the pallet. Nevertheless, the 
evidence in the instant case does not even show that def en-
dant had •responsible control• of the pallet. Many other 
explanations for plaintiff's injury would take it out of 
either the control or responsibility of defendant and indi-
cate that negligence should not be inferred. The suppliers 
of the pallet could have caused a latent defect when they 
constructed the pallet. Third parties could have run over or 
otherwise tampered with the pallets as Mr. Hunt testified. 
(R. 341, 365-66). As in Reich, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur should not apply when there are so many possible 
explanations for the occurrence. 
In Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 11 Utah 2d 30, 354 
P.2d 580 (1960), plaintiff claimed he swallowed a paper clip 
lodged in a bottle of soda beverage that defendants bottled 
and retailed. The lower court granted summary judgment for 
defendant and this court affirmed, holding that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. This court explained 
-11-
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that since prior to consumption, the plaintiff had stored the 
beverage in an unlocked fruit room connected with his garage 
(which was also open on occasion) and since invitees to a 
birthday party were free to go into the room at any time, 
defendant did not have management or control of the bottle or 
beverage contained therein. This court cited an earlier case 
with approval and stated: 
[I]njustice ... might eventuate by inferring neg-
ligence against a bottler in a case like this, where 
the container has a cap that easily can be removed 
and replaced without detection, and over which con-
tainer the bottler has no further control in the 
hands of intermediaries including retailers, ulti-
mate consumers, invitees to a party, or others who 
easily could have had access to the bottle .••. 
• . . To say the bottler here had any control 
when the plaintiff purchased the bottle from [the 
retail store], and thereafter, simply would be to 
blind oneself to the facts. 
Id., 354 P.2d at 581 (citing Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (1950)). 
Milligan and Jordan are analogous to the facts of the 
instant case. There is absolutely no evidence that defendant 
manufactured the pallets used by plaintiff. They were merely 
provided for plaintiff's convenience. The pallets were 
accessible to third parties and could easily be tampered with 
at any time either before or after they came into defendant's 
possession. (R. 341, 365-66). The facts of this case simply 
do not justify application of res ipsa loquitur. 
-12-
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Other jurisdictions have supported the holdings of Reich 
and Milligan. See, e.g., Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons 
Structural Steel Co., 328 Mo. 72, 40 S.W.2d 702, 705 (1931) 
(other possible explanations, including latent defects or 
other facts raising equally valid inferrences of negligence, 
prevent the application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur); De Witt Properties, Inc. v. City of New York, 44 
N.Y.2d 417, 426-427, 406 N.Y.S.2d 16, 21-22 {1978) (where 
there is evidence that a gas company could have been respon-
sible for break in water line, negligence of the city cannot 
be inferred from the mere happening of the break); Winkler v. 
Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 240 Pa. Super. 641, 359 A.2d 440, 
443-44 {1976), aff'd, 477 Pa. 445, 384 A.2d 241 {1978) 
{because there are •numerous explanations• and the presence 
of a latent, undiscoverable defect that could have caused a 
sticking door, plaintiff could not recover on the basis of 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). 
In the case at bar, defendant's employee, Mr. Hunt, tes-
tified that it was entirely possible for the pallets to be 
removed, replaced, run over or otherwise tampered with by 
third parties. (R. 341, 365-66). In fact, plaintiff affir-
matively employs that testimony in his brief. Further, there 
is evidence that there was a latent defect in the pallet upon 
which plaintiff was injured, which was not discoverable by a 
-13-
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reasonable inspection. While plaintiff claims that defendant 
should have discovered the latent defect, plaintiff has never 
explained what type of inspection or testing should have been 
employed by defendant. Surely plaintiff would not require 
defendant to do any more inspection than he did himself; 
namely, both a visual inspection and a physical inspection by 
actually stepping on the pallet and testing its strength. 
Plaintiff was just as capable, if not more so, of discovering 
the defect because of his vast experience with pallets. 
Finally, Mr. Hunt testified that the pallets were 
received from various suppliers. (R. 336-37). The pallet 
upon which plaintiff was injured was one constructed by one 
of those third persons, rather than by defendant, and there 
was no evidence that any pallet was constructed or supplied 
solely by defendant. The manufacturer's faulty construction 
could have caused a latent defect in the pallet. Because of 
these many possible explanations, the pallet could not have 
been within the control or responsibility of defendant and 
plaintiff should not be entitled to invoke the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GAVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON UNAVOIDABLE 
ACCIDENT AND EVEN IF IT WAS ERRONEOUS, IT 
WAS HARMLESS ERROR 
The trial court's instruction on unavoidable accident was 
proper under the circumstances of the case. Notwithstanding 
any claimed error in giving the instruction, such error, if 
any, was harmless. 
Plaintiff has already drawn the attention of the court to 
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968}. 
There, plaintiff brought an action on behalf of her son to 
recover for the son's injury when defendant, while backing 
out of a driveway, ran into the boy. Defendant contended 
that the accident was unavoidable because she could not see 
the child when she began backing. The evidence apparently 
supported such a contention because the trial court gave an 
instruction on unavoidable accident. The trial court entered 
judgment on a verdict for defendant and plaintiff appealed, 
claiming the instruction on unavoidable accident was im-
proper. This court affirmed, holding that under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the instruction was proper and stated: 
It is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e., 
unusual and unexpected occurrences, which result in 
injury and which happen without anyone failing to 
exercise reasonable care; and when this is so the 
accident is properly classified as unavoidable inso-
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far as legal causation or the imposition of lia-
bility is concerned. 
Id., 436 P.2d at 445. Accord, Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 
P.2d 828, 834-35 (Utah 1980); Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 
465 P.2d 169, 170-71 (1970). 
Courts from other jurisdictions have permitted the use of 
an unavoidable accident instruction in cases where a latent 
or undiscoverable defect may have been the cause of the acci-
dent. In Guanzon v. Kalamau, 48 Hawaii 330, 402 P.2d 289 
(1965), plaintiff was struck from behind while sitting at a 
stop in his vehicle. Defendant, the driver of the vehicle 
behind, claimed that his brakes failed but that just prior to 
the accident they worked fine. The lower court gave an in-
struction on unavoidable accident and entered ju~gment for 
defendant pursuant to a jury verdict. The Hawaii Supreme 
Court affirmed with regard to the unavoidable accident in-
struction and held that since there was some evidence to show 
that the accident was unavoidable, under the circumstances 
the instruction was proper. The court stated that •[m]echan-
ical failure or malfunction due to a latent defect would 
clearly seem to constitute 'exceptional circumstances' and an 
instance in which the unavoidable accident instruction 'is 
peculiarly appropriate.•• Id., 402 P.2d at 297. See also, 
Ackerman v. Terpsma, 74 Wash. 2d 209, 445 P.2a 19, 23 (1968) 
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(where there was some evidence of latent defect, an unavoid-
able accident instruction was proper). 
In this case, plaintiff states that although he observed 
a crack in one of the boards and a bend in another, he did 
not observe any defects in the specific boards he claims 
broke and he allegedly fell through. (R. 235, 296, 308, 314, 
322). Similarly, defendant was not aware of any defects in 
the boards. (R. 360-61). Since plaintiff, who had vast 
experience with pallets, was unable to observe the defect, it 
must have been a latent defect in the pallet that caused 
plaintiff's injury. Thus, the accident may have been 
unavoidable since neither plaintiff nor defendant observed 
the defect in the pallet, and were not negligent in failing 
to do so because the defect was latent and undetectable by 
any reasonable inspection or testing. Consequently, it was 
proper for the trial court in this case to give the unavoid-
able accident instruction. 
Even assuming the unavoidable accident instruction was 
given in error, such error, if any, was not prejudicial and 
was harmless. This court further stated in Woodhouse: 
[E]ven the cases which disapprove of the instruction 
as error recognize that whether it is ground for 
reversal depends on the circumstances of the partic-
ular case. In that connection it is important that 
at the time of the trial of this case it had never 
been adjudicated in this state that the giving of an 
instruction on unavoidable accident was prejudicial 
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error. • • • Assuming it to be the repetion of an 
idea and that it is best to avoid repetion where 
possible, the mere duplication of an idea in the 
instruction is not reversable error. If it were, 
very few if any sets of instructions could be sus-
tained as errorless. 
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, 445 
(1968). Thus, even if, as plaintiff apparently contends, the 
instruction was duplicative of the other negligence instruc-
tions, it was not reversable error. 
This court states in Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 
828, 834-35 (1980), that an unavoidable accident instruction 
is not prejudicial or reversible error •unless it results in 
the instructions given being weighted, as a whole, in favor 
of the defendant.• The instructions in the present case in-
dicate no such •weighting.• Further, the instruction was 
somewhat helpful to plaintiff since it could be used to 
determine that plaintiff was not negligent either. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO PERMIT 
PLAIN~IFF TO CROSS-EXAMINE DEFENDANT'S WIT-
NESS FROM WRITTEN INTERROGATORY ANSWERS 
Rule 33(b) provides: •rnterrogatories may relate to any 
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the 
answers may be used to the extent permitted by the rules of 
evidence.• Utah R. Civ. P. 33(b). Thus, plaintiff was 
required to show that the Answers to Interrogatories were 
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admissible as evidence before they could be admitted and he 
could use them for the purpose of cross-examination." Plain-
tiff claims that the Answers to Interrogatories signed by Mr. 
Street, defendant's manager, were admissible as evidence 
because they were to be used for the purposes of impeachment 
and they were an admission of a party. 
The attempted use of the Answers to Interrogatories for 
impeachment purposes was inappropriate. Mr. Hunt admitted 
that he did not know whether Mr. Kusy had fallen off the 
pallet or whether it had broken. (R. 369). Hunt simply said 
that after the accident he saw no broken boards, but he did 
not see the event itself. (R. 353, 356, 366). Thus, im-
peachment by use of the answer to Interrogatory No. 9 (which 
states that the pallet broke and Mr. Kuzy fell through) would 
be meaningless since Mr. Hunt admitted that Mr. Kuzy could 
have fallen through broken boards in the pallet. (R. 369). 
In light of plaintiff's virtually uncontradicted testimony 
wherein he stated he fell through a broken board on the 
pallet and Mr. Hunt's testimony that it could have happened 
that way, the use of the Answers to Interrogatories for pur-
poses of impeachment was irrelevant and would have added 
nothing to plaintiff's case. 
Plaintiff also argues that the Answers to Interrogatories 
were admissible as an admission of a party. He cites Hill v. 
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Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970), 
which holds: •1n any case where answers to interrogatories 
are to be used to establish a fact, they can only be used as 
admissions against the party making them.• Id., 477 P.2d at 
151. 
Rule 63(7) of the Rules of Evidence provides that an 
admission is admissible if it is •[a]s against himself a 
statement by a person who is a party to the action in his 
individual or a representative capacity and, if the latter, 
who is acting in such representative capacity in making the 
statement.• Utah. R. Evid. 63(7). In the case at bar, Mr. 
Hunt was not acting in a representative capacity for defen-
dant; he was acting as a witness to the events of the acci-
dent. The party who was acting in his representative capa-
city for defendant by signing the Answers to Interrogatories, 
Mr. Street, was not present at the trial and was not sub-
poened by plaintiff. There was no evidence that he was 
unavailable to be called as a witness at trial. (R. 365, 
422). Consequently, the lower court ruled correctly that the 
Answers to Interrogatories could not be admitted. 
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POINT IV 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE 
AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES INDICATE NO PAS-
SION OR PREJUDICE AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff's claim that the award for general damages was 
as a result of passion and prejudice against plaintiff by the 
jury, is unfounded. 
Certainly, the best reason for the jury verdict of norni-
nal general damages was the fact that they had already found 
defendant was not negligent in causing plaintiff's injury, 
and most certainly knew that defendant would not be required 
to pay !.!!Y amount. It was more likely that, instead of the 
no negligence finding being influenced by the low general 
damages finding, it was the other way around. Even if the 
jury improperly awarded no general damages, this court should 
not find error when the trial judge remedied the situation by 
causing the jury to return for further deliberation on 
general damages as provided under Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Langton v. International Transport, 
Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211, 1215 (1971). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the criteria for giving 
the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Not only is 
there evidence that plaintiff's injury could have happened 
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without negligence on anyone's part, there is also evidence 
that the pallet that plaintiff fell through or from, was not 
within the control or responsibility of defendant. Indeed, 
plaintiff himself had control over whether he was injured by 
the pallet because he was at least as able, if not more so, 
to observe any defects that might be present in the pallet. 
The unavoidable accident instruction was proper under the 
circumstances of the case since there was evidence that a 
latent defect, undiscoverable by either of the parties, could 
have caused the accident. Regardless, even if the instruc-
tion was given in error, it was harmless since the instruc-
tion was at most, duplicative and did not cause the instruc-
tions as a whole to be weighted in defendant's favor. 
Under the Rules of Evidence, plaintiff has failed to show 
any reason why Answers to Interrogatories signed by Mr. 
Street could be admitted at trial for the purposes of cross-
examining Mr. Hunt. The Answers to Interrogatories had no 
impeachment value since Mr. Hunt was not the person who 
signed the Answers to Interrogatories on defendant's behalf, 
nor did he deny what was contained in the Answers to Inter-
rogatories. Further, the Answers to Interrogatories could 
not be admitted as an admission against a party since Mr. 
Hunt was not acting in his representative capacity for K-Mart 
at the trial, but simply as a witness. The proper represen-
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tative of K-Mart with regard to the Answers to Interroga-
tories, Mr. Street, was not present at the trial and plain-
tiff did not show that he was unavailable. 
Finally, plaintiff has failed to establish that the lower 
court improperly denied a new trial on the basis that the 
jury gave an inadequate general damage award. 
The trial court committed no reversible error and its 
judgment was proper. The judgment for defendant and order 
denying a new trial should be affirmed. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Allan rson 
Attorney or Defendant/ 
Respondent 
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